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By Gilbert H. Montague of the New York Bar.
On March iith, 1912, the Supreme Court of the United States
announced, in a careful opinion, its decision in Henry v. A. B.
Dick Company. The opinion of the Court was written by
Justice Lurton, with whom concurred Justice McKenna, Justice
Holmes and Justice Van Devanter. A dissenting opinion was
read by Chief Justice White, with whom concurred Justice
Hughes and Justice Lamar. Justice Day did not hear the argu-
ment and took no part in the decision of the case. Justice Pitney
became a member of the Court after the case was argued, and
therefore had no part in the decision. Relying upon all these
grounds, and also upon the important bearing of the decision on
prosecutions under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act then pending in
the Federal Courts, application for a re-hearing was made by the
defendants-appellant, and application for leave to be made a party
and for a rehearing was made by the Attorney-General. Both
applications were denied, without opinion, on April 8th, 1912.
While the rules of the Supreme Court provide that a re-hearing
will not be granted unless desired by one of the justices who con-
curred in the decision, it is not unfair to surmise, in a case of this
importance, that this action of the Supreme Court indicated that
a re-hearing before the Court, as now constituted, would not
change the decision.
Not since the creation of the patent system, following the
recommendation of Alexander Hamilton in his Report on Manu-
facturers, and the adoption in 1790 of the first patent law by the
first American Congress, has the Supreme Court rendered a
better considered decision affecting patent rights.
I The opinion of the Supreme Court in the Dick case was written
by Justice Lurton, who probably has tried more important cases
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than any, American judge now living. With him concurred
Justice Holmes, Justice Van Devanter, whose experience in patent
law while circuit judge was very thorough,' and Justice McKenna,
who, four years ago, wrote the opinion of the Supreme Court in
one of the most important cases of recent years-the Paper Bag
Case2-- with which opinion Chief Justice White, then an associate
justice, entirely agreed. President Taft, when Circuit Judge, sat
with Judge Lurton and repeatedly agreed with Judge Lurton's
opinions in patent matters upon points that later were involved
in the Dick decision.
3
The majority opinion in the Dick case simply states the law as
established by an unbroken line of previous decisions in the
United States, in Great Britain and in other English speaking
jurisdictions.4  With these decisions Chief Justice White and
Judge Taft, as their entire judicial records show, have heretofore
been in absolute agreement.
The considerations properly introductory to the discussion of
this decision have already been discussed in a former article,5 so
that with that article as an introduction, this latest decision of the
Supreme Court on the subject of patents may be directly exam-
ined.
H.
The Dick Company owned patents covering a mimeograph. It
sold to a certain Miss Skou a mimeograph embodying the inven-
tion covered by these patents, subject, however, to a license,
printed and attached to the machine and reading as follows:
1 See National Phonograph Co. v. Schlegel, 128 Fed., 733 (C. C. A.,
8th C., 1904).
James Heekin Co. v. Baker, 138 Fed., 63 (C. C. A., 8th C., 1905.)
2 Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U. S., 405.
3 Heaton-Peninsular Button Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77
Fed., 288 (1896).
Thomson-Houston Electric Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., 80 Fed., 712 (1897).
Metropolitan Trust Co. v. Columbus S. & H. Ry. Co., 95 Fed., 18, 23
(1899).
. See collection of authorities: G. H. Montague: Sherman Anti-Trust
Act and the Patent Law: YALE LAW JOURNAL, April, 1912.
G. H. Montague: The Sherman Anti-Trust Act and" the Patent Law,
YALE LAW JOURNAL, April, 1912.
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"LICENSE RESTRICTION.
"This machine is sold by the A. B. Dick'
Company with the license restriction that
it may be used only with the stencil paper,
ink and other supplies made by A. B. Dick
Company, Chicago, U. S. A."
Henry's firm sold to Miss Skou some ink suitable for use
upon this machine, with knowledge of this license restriction urider
which Miss Skou had bought the machine, and with the expecta-
tion that the ink would be used with this mimeograph. The ques-
tion presented to the Court was:
Did the acts of the Henry firm constitute contributory infringe-
ment of the Dick Company's patents?
The Supreme Court decided that these acts constituted con-
tributory infringement.
III.
Was this a suit arising under the patent law? This was the
fundamental question which the Supreme Court faced at the out-
set.
"That the license agreement constitutes a contract not to use
the machine in a prohibited manner is plain," says the Court.
"That defendants might be sued upon the broken contract, or for
its enforcement, or for the forfeiture of the license is likewise
plain. * * * That the patentee may waive the tort and sue upon
the broken contract or in assumpsit is elementary. * * * The test
of jurisdiction is this: Does the complainant 'set up some right,
title or interest under the patent laws of the United States, or
make it appear that some right or privilege will be defeated by
one construction, or sustained by another, of those laws?'"
Applying these principles to the facts of the case, the Court
says:
"The bill alleges that the complainant's patent has been
infringed by the breach of the conditions upon which the patented
machines was sold. The remedy it seeks is an injunction against
indirect infringement by the defendants. The facts stated upon
the face of the bill may be insufficient to show an infringement of
the patent; but the right to treat the conduct of the defendants as
an indirect infringement is a right which the complainant sets up
as arising under the patent law. One construction of the scope
of the grant will sustain the rights asserted, if the facts be as
alleged, and another will defeat those rights."
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Upon these facts the Court concludes "that although the com-
plainant might have sued upon the broken contract, or brought a
bill to declare a forfeiture of the licensee's right for breach of
the implied covenanted right to operate it only in connection with
materials supplied by it, it has elected to sue for infringement."
One of the grounds-perhaps one may call it the chief "aggra-
vating" cause-for Chief Justice White's vehement dissent from
the opinion of the Supreme Court in the Dick case is his expressed
belief that "the effect of that ruling is to destroy, in a very large
measure, the judicial authority of the States by unwarrantedly
extending the Federal judicial power * * * since that ruling not
only vastly extends the Federal judicial power, as above stated,
but as to all the innumerable subjects to which the ruling may be
made to apply, makes it the duty of the courts of the LTnited States
to test the rights and obligations of the parties, not by the general
law of the land, in accord with the conformity act, but by the pro-
visions of the patent law."
Upon this point, Chief Justice White palpably relies upon
"argument from inconvenience." Except for a few quotations
from authorities which, in candour it must be conceded, the
majority of the Court dispose of by ample authority and unan-
swerable logic, Chief Justice White rests his argument, as to this
point, upon the proposition that, under the decision from which
he dissents, "a patentee in selling the machine covered by his
patent has power by contract to extend the patent so as to cause
it to embrace things which it does not include." This proposition,
upon which the entire position of Chief justice White depends,
obviously assumes the most disputed question in the case. Chief
Justice White, and also the majority of the Court, discuss this
question at length in their opinions; and this discussion will here-
inafter be examined. The point deserving of present notice is
that the conclusion of the majority, in respect to the jurisdiction of
the Court, was reached independently of its conclusions regard-
ing the validity and enforcibility of the license restriction in the
case; while the conclusion of Chief Justice White, in respect to the
jurisdiction of the Court, was reached chiefly as the result of his.
conclusion that the license restriction was contrary to public
policy.
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IV.
What restriction may a patentee impose upon the use of his.
patented article? This was the broad question 'which the
Supreme Court had to decide.
In a former article the following propositions were shown to,
be generally established by the weight of authority in the United
States and in Great Britain:
The owner of a patent may impose restrictions upon the use of
the patent and the manufacture and sale of the patented article
by the licensee, and such restrictions, if part of an express agree-
ment between the owner and such licensee, may be enforced by
the owner against such licensee.
The owner of a patent may impose restrictions upon the use
and re-sale of the patented article by the party to whom such
article is sold, and such restrictions, if made known to such party,
may be enforced against such party by the owner of the patent,
even though no express agreement exists between them.
Both these propositions have been emphatically endorsed by
the decision of the Supreme Court in the Dick case.
The Court says:
"That a patentee may effectually restrict the time, place or
manner of using a patented machine, so that the prohibited use
will constitute an infringement of the patent, is fully conceded.
* * * The books abound in cases. upholding the right of a patent
owner of a machine to license another to use it subject to any
qualification in respect of time, place or purpose of use which the
licensee agrees to accept. Any use in excess of the license would
obviously be an infringing use and the license would be no
defense."
Just here is the point of departure of Chief Justice White's
dissenting opinion. "The entire title," he declares, "was parted
with; in other Words, there was no condition imposed affecting-
the title or the uses to whch the machine might be applied or the
duration of the use." The Chief Justice here assumes that when
the patent owner parts with the title to the patented machine, he
has somehow lost all power to enforce any condition affecting-
"the uses to which the machine might be applied ;" even though
in the act of transferring title, and as part of that very transac-
tion, and even as partial consideration for the sale, the patentee
8 G. H. Montague: The Sherman Anti-Trust Act and the Patent Laws
YALE LAW JOURNAL, April, 1912.
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required the customer to assent to certain prescribed restrictions
affecting "the uses to whicl the machine might be applied." How
completely Chief Justice White assumes all these points appears
from his further statement that "the sale here in question was one
of all the rights which the patent protected."
Did the sale here in question dispose of "all the rights which
the patent protected ?"
Under Article I, Section 8, Subdivision 8 of the Federal Con-
stitution, Congress has power to "promote the progress of science
and useful arts by securing, for limited times, to authors and
inventors, the exclusive right to their respective writings and dis-
coveries."
Accordingly, Section 4884 of the Revised Statutes has been
enacted, providing that a patent owner shall have "the exclusive
right to make, use and vend the invention or discovery." This
"exclusive right" is in effect three "exclusive rights," i. e., the
"exclusive right" to make, the "exclusive right" to use, and the
"exclusive right" to sell the patented article.7
Since the patent owner's "exclusive right" is composed of the
?exclusive right" to make, the "exclusive right" to use, and the
"exclusive right" to sell the patented invention, the patent owner
may, according as he sees fit, dispose of one, or more, or any part
of these component "exclusive rights," Thus, when he elects to
manufacture the patehted article himself, he reserves to himself
the "exclusive right" to make, and disposes simply of all or part
of the "exclusive rights" to sell and to use the patented article.
Again, if he elects not to sell the patented article, but simply to
dispose of it on a royalty basis, he reserves to himself the "exclu-
sive rights" to make and to sell, and disposes simply of the right
of use. Similarly, if he elects to dispose of only part of the
"exclusive right" to use the patented article, he may reserve to
himself the "exclusive rights" to make and to sell the patented arti-
cle, and also part of the "exclusive right" of use, and may dispose
of simply a portion of his "exclusive right" of use, by granting
7 Bloomer v. McQuewan, 14 How., 538.
Heaton-Peninsular Button Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77
Fed., 288 (C. C. A., 6th C., 1896).
John. D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartnan, 153 Fed., 24, 27 (C. C. A., 6th
C., 1907).
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merely a limited right of use ;-simply, for instance, the right to
use the patented article only under such conditions and only with
such supplies as the atent owner shall prescribe.
Like the owner of any other property, the patent owner "cannot
be compelled to part with his own except on inducements to his
liking."" Like an owner of unimproved real estate, the patent
owner may decline to use his invention, or to allow others to use.
it. Like a real estate owner who prefers to continue an owner,
the patent owner may reserve to himself the right of ownership
and sale, and, by lease or otherwise, may simply dispose of part
of the right to use the property. Like every real estate owner
that is a landlord, the patent owner may require that his property
be used only under certain specified conditions, and for certain
specified purposes, and with certain specified accessories.
The rights of the patent owner are neither greater nor more
unusual than the familiar rights of real estate owners or other
property owners. Indeed, the patent owner's rights are vastly
curtailed, as contrasted with the rights of other property owners,
in that the owners of every other form of property may exercise
their rights for so long a period as they and their successors may
desire, while the patent owner may exercise none of his rights
beyond the duration of his patent, and at the expiration of the
statutory period of seventeen years must relinquish to the public
all of his rights.
"By a sale of a patented article subject to no conditions," says
the Supreme Court in the Dick case, "the purchaser undeniably
acquires the right to use the article for alf the purposes of the
patent so long as it endures. He may use it where, when and
how he pleases, and may dispose of the same unlimited right to
another. * * An absolute and unconditional sale operates to pass
the patented thing outside the boundaries of the patent, because
such a sale implies that the patentee consents that the purchaser
may use the machine so long as its identity is preserved." The
Court then draws the distinction "between the property right in
the material composing a patented machine, and the right to use
for the purpose and in the manner pointed out by the patent. The
latter may be and often is the greater element of value and the
buyer may desire it only to apply to some or all of the uses
included in the invention. But the two things are separable
8 Victor Talking Machine Co. v. The Fair, 123 Fed., 424, 426 (C. C. A.,
7th C., 1903.)
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rights." The Court then explains its meaning, and compacts the
kernel of its decision in these words:
"A license is not an assignment of any interest in the patent
It is a mere permission granted by the patentee. It may be a
license to make, sell and use, or it may be limited to any one of
these separable rights. If it be a license to use, it operates only-
as a right to use without being liable as an infringer. If a licensee
be sued, he can escape liability to the patentee for the use of his
invention by showing that the use is within his license. But if
his use be one prohibited by the license, the latter is of no avail as
a defense. As a license passes no interest in the monopoly, it
has been described as a mere waiver of the right to sue by the
patentee. Robinson &n Patents, Sec. 8o6, 8o8.
"We repeat. The property right to a patented machine may-
pass to a purchaser with no right of use, or with only the right to
use in a specified way, or at a specified place, or for a specified-
purpose. The unlimited right of exclusive use which is possessed,
by and guaranteed to the patentee will be granted if the sale be
unconditional. But if the right of use be confined by specific
restriction, the use not permitted is necessarily reserved to the
patentee. If that reserved control of use of the machine be vio-
lated, the patent is thereby invaded. This right to sever owner-
ship and use is deducible from the nature of a patent monopoly-
and is recognized in the cases."
Ample authority for these propositions is cited by the Supreme
Court. From authorities quoted in a former article,9 and fron
the Court's own reasoning, these propositions seem fully supported
by precedent and logic. Furthermore, they furnish the means of
refuting Chief Justice White with his own reasoning. For-
Chief Justice White expressly recognizes the difference which
exists "between the conveyance of all one's rights covered by a.
patent, and a transfer of only a part of such rights." The major-
ity of the Supreme Court conclusively demonstrate that the Dick
Company, in disposing of its mimeograph subject to the license
restriction in question, transferred "only a part of such rights."
VI.
Ernough has been said to show the grounds of Chief Justice
White's dissenting opinion, and the doubtful validity of these.
grounds. The vehemence of his dissent from the opinion of the-
Court and the extravagance of some suppositious cases of hard--
9 G. H. Montague: The Shernian Anti-Trust Act and the P'atent Law
YALE LAW JoURNAL, April, 1912.
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ship which he imagined possible under this decision have given to
his dissenting views an interest beyond their intrinsic importance.
Chief Justice White ignors the all-important circumstance that no
license restriction is enforcible, under the law as laid down by the
Court, unless the restriction is "brought home to the person
acquiring the article" at the time the article is acquired. To make
a license restriction enforcible, the purchaser must have notice
that he buys with only a qualified right of use. The notion,
engendered by Chief Justice White's dissenting opinion, that
Henry would have been held as an infringer, if Miss Skou or any
other user of the Dick mimeograph had bought Henry's ink at a
corner drug store, has absolutely no foundation in fact. The
infringement in the Dick case, as the Court expressly held, con-
sisted in the fact that Henry, knowing of the license restriction,
and with the expectation and intention that his ink would be used
for the purpose of violating this license restriction, incitied Miss
Skou, intentionally and deliberately, to violate the license restric-
tion-to which Miss Skou, as Henry well knew, had expressly
assented when she acquired the mimeograph-and supplied Miss
Skou with the means of accomplishing th*is wrongful act. Indeed
the Court below expressly found that Henry deliberately and
knowingly instigated Miss Skou to this wrongful act, and even
instructed her that, if she would your Henry's ink into Dick's can
and throw away Henry's can, she would not be caught violating
the license restrictiono Except in several particulars, which will
hereinafter be noticed, further discussion of his dissenting opinion
is unnecessary; and the analysis of the majority opinon of the
Supreme Court will now be continued.
VII.
Having decided that the patentee may "subdivide his exclusive
right of use when he makes and sells a patented device," the
Supreme Court next lays down the proposition that "the extent
of the license to use, which is carried by the sale, must depend
upon whether any restriction was placed updn the use, and
brought home to the person acquiring the article." The Court
elaborates this point:
"To begin .with, the purchaser must have notice that he buys
with only a qualified right of use. He has a right to assume/ in
2
0 A. B. Dick Co. v. Henry, 149 Fed., 424, 428, C. C. S.. D., N. Y., 907.
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the. absence of knowledge, that the seller passes an unconditional
title to the machine, with no limitations upon the use. Where,
then, is the line between a lawful and an unlawful qualification
upon the use? This is a question of statutory construction.
But with what eye shall we read a meaning into it? It is a
statute creating and protecting a monopoly. It is a true monopoly,
one having its origin in the ultimate authority, the Constitution.
Shall we deal with the statute creating and guaranteeing the
exclusive right which is granted to the inventor with the narrow
scrutiny proper when a statutory right is asserted to uphold a
claim which is lacking in those moral elements which appeal to
the normal man? Or shall we approach it as a monopoly
granted to subserve a broad public policy, by which large ends
are to be attained, and, therefore, to be construed so as to give
effect to a wise and beneficial purpose? That we must neithe
"
transcend the statute, nor cut down its clear meaning, is plain."
After emphasizing the fact that this constitutional monopoly
"extends to the right of making, selling and using, and these are
separable and substantive rights," the Court quotes with approval
its language in Bement v. National Harrow Company," in which
Chief Justice White, then an Associate Justice, participated and
concurred:
"The general rule is absolute freedom in the use or sale of
rights under the patent laws of the United States. The very
object of these laws is monopoly, and the rule is, with few excep-
tions, that any conditions which are not in their very nature illegal
with regard to this kind of property, imposed by the patentee and
agreed to by the licensee for the right to manufacture or use or
sell the article, will be upheld by the Courts. The fact that the
conditions in the contracts keep up the monopoly or fix prices
does not render them illegal."
This cogent reasoning--with which Chief Justice White then
entirely agreed-covers the whole ground. The logic which
commanded the support of Associate Justice White completely
exposes the fallacy into which Chief Justice White has fallen, in
his dissenting opinion, by departing from the prnciples to which
he formerly gave hs adherence.
Continuing, the Supreme Court in the Dick case quotes with
approval it opinion in Bement v. National Harrow Company, to
the effect that the Sherman Act "clearly does not refer to that kind
of a restraint of interstate commerce which may arise from
reasonable and legal conditions imposed upon the assignee or
licensee of a patent by the owner thereof, restricting the terms
11 186 U. S., 70.
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upon which the article may be used and the price to be demanded
therefor.''1 2  From this the Court concludes that "it must follow
that any other reasonable stipulation, not inherently violative
of some substantive law, imposed by the patentee as part of a sale
of a patented machine, would be clearly valid and enforcible."
VIII.
The Supreme Court then takes up the "argument from incon-
venience," which Chief Justice White vehemently urged as a con-
trolling reason for repudiating the conclusion of the Court and
for urging Congress to change the condition which, he declared,
would result from this decision. The Court says:
"But it has been very earnestly said that a condition restricting
the buyer to use it only in connection with ink made by the
patentee is one of a character which gives to a patentee the power
to extend his monopoly so as to cause it to embrace any subject,
not within the patent, which he chooses to require that the inven-
tion shall be used in connection with. Of course the argument
does not mean that the effect of such a condition is to cause
things to become patented which were not so without the require-
ment. The stencil, the paper and the ink made by the patentee
will continue to be unpatented. Anyone will be as free to make,
sell and use like articles as they would be without this restriction,
save in one particular-namely, they may not be sold to a user of
one of the patentee's machines with intent that they shall be used
in violation of the license. To that extent competition in the
sale of such articles, for use with the machine, will be affected;
for sale to such users for infringing purposes will constitute con-
tributory infringement. But the same consequence results from
the sale of any article to one who proposes to associate it with
other articles to infringe a patent, when such purpose is known to
the seller. But could it be said that the doctrine of contributory
infringement operates to extend the monopoly of the patent over
subjects not within it because one subjects himself to the penalties
of the law when he sells unpatented things for an infringing use?
If a patentee says, 'I may suppress my patent if I will. I may
make and have made devices under my patent, but I will neither
sell, nor permit anyone to use the patented things,' he is within
his right and none can complain. But if he says, 'I will sell with
the right to use only with other things proper for using with the
machines, and l-will sell at the actual cost of the machines to me,
provided you will agree to use only such articles as are made by
12 For further discussion of this proposition, and a collection of the
authorities, see G. H. Montague: The Sherman Anti-Trust Act and the
Patent Law, YALE LAW JOURNAL, April, 1912.
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me in coninection therewith,' if he chooses to take his profit in this
way, instead of taking it by a higher price for the machines, has
he exceeded his exclusive right to make, sell and use his ,patented
machines? The market for the sale of such articles to the users
of hi's machine, which, by such a condition, he takes to hims'elf,
was a market which he alone created by the making and .selling
of a new invention. Had he kept his invention to himself, no
ink could have been sold by others for use upon machines embody-
ing that invention. By selling it subject to the restriction he
took nothing from others and in no wise restricted their legitimate
market."
This bug-bear of "monopoly" in'non-patented supplies cbmpre-
hended within'license -restrictions covering patented articles has
many times been dispelled by the Courts; is but never more effect-
ively than in the passage above quoted.. By unswerving applica-
tion of the same common sense, the Supreme Court disposes of
the extravagant suppositious cases of hardship, which Chief
justice White imagined might happen under the decision of the
Court:
"For the purpose of testing the consequence of a ruling which
Will -support the lawfulness of 'a sale of a patented machine for
use only in connection with supplies necessary for its operation
bought from the patentee, many fanciful suggestions of condi-
tions which might be imposed by a patentee have been pressed
upon us. 'Thus it is said that a patentee of a coffee pot might
sell on condition that it be used only with coffee bought from him,
or, if the article be a circular saw, that it might be sold on condi-.
tion that it be used only in sawing logs procured from him. These
and other illustrations are used to indicate that this method of
marketing a patented article may be carried to such an extent as
to inconvenience the public and involve innocent people in unwit-
ting infringements. But these illustrations all fail of their pur-
pose, because the public is always free to take or refuse the pat-
ented article on the terms imposed. - If they be too onerous or
not in keeping with the benefits, the patented article will not find
a market. The public, by permitting the invention to go unused,
loses nothing which it had before, and when the patent expires
"will be free tQ use. the. invention without compensation or restric-
tion.' This was pointed. out in the Paper Bag case, where the
inventor would neither use himself 'nor allow others to use, and
yet was held entitled to restrain infringement, because he had the
exclusive right to keep all others from using during the life of the
patent. This larger right embraces the jesseroQLpuermitting
- '3 See authorities duoted' and ctllected, G.-H.: Mont'ague: The Sher:
man Anti Trust Act and the Patent Law,-YAt LAw JoURNAL, April, 1912.
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others to use upon such terms as the patentee chooses to prescribe.
It must not be forgotten that we are dealing with a constitutional
and statutory monopoly. An attack upon the rights under a
patent because it secures a monopoly to make, to sell and to use,
is an attack upon the whole patent system. -We are not at liberty
to say that the Constitution has unwisely provided for granting
a monopolistic right to inventors, or that Congress, has unwisely
failed to impose limitations upon the inventor's exclusive right of
Use."
Ix.
The economic justification of license restrictions appears from
the most cursory knowledge of industrial conditions."'
In the case of innumerable patented machines, no accurate or
convenient measuri of the amount of use and output is afforded,
except by measuring the supplies used in connection with the
machine. By requiring the user of the patented article to obtain
such material from a single source, the patent owner insures the
means of accurately, inexpensively and conveniently measuring
the amount of the use and output of the patented article, and col-
lecting the royalty so determined, by charging for such supplies
a sum sufficient to cover their cost, and also an additional amount
in the nature of royalty for the use of the patented article. As
regards many patented articles, which otherwise could be sold
only in small numbers, at a large outright purchase price, no
other means of determining a royalty, based upon the amount of
use and output, can be devised.
"Under such an arrangement, the money burden upon the
licensee does not fall upon him all at one time, like the necessity
of paying at the outset a large purchase price, but is distributed
over a period sufficient to enable him to derive, from the use of
the patented article, the means of compensating the patent owner.
Besides these important considerations, there are others of
paramount importance. The satisfactory operation of the pat-
ented article may, and in many cases does, entirely depend upon
its use with specially prepared supplies, or in tontinuity with
other specially adapted machines, or in some particular manner.
An electrical appliance, adapted for use with a particular kind
6f battery, may be very effective when so used-inwhich case
14 Upon this point 'see G." H. Montague: "The Gist of te Supreme
Court Dediion ht the .Dick Patent'Case," E 4ieeri,- Magazine, May,
1912Z '' .. . .: . . ... . ...:- "
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its usefulness to the licensee is considerable, and its commercial
value to the patent owner is correspondingly gratifying ;-while
if used with another kind of battery, it may be ineffective,-in
which case its usefulness to the licensee is slight and its commer-
cial value to the patent owner is disappointing. A license requir-
ing that the appliance be used only with the battery specially
adapted to it guarantees the highest degree of usefulness to the
user, and assures to the patent owner the commercial value of
the patented arti6le to which he is justly entitled.
A patented machine, used in manufacture, may be contrived,
with great nicety, to take the partly finished product as it leaves
another machine, and to continue the process of manufacture for
another stage from that point, and then to turn it over to another
machine, which continues the manufacture from that point. This
particular machine, it is obvious, must be accurately adjusted, so
as to supplement precisely the work done by the machine that
immediately precedes it in the manufacturing process, and to
match exactly the requirements of the machine that will take up
the work at the point where it leaves off. The satisfactory oper-
ation of the particular machine in question may, and in actual
instances frequently does, entirely depend upon the nicety, accu-
racy and precision with which it is adapted to the machine that
immediately precedes it, and to the machine that immediately fol-
lows it in the manufacturing process. Unless the machine that
precedes it is accurately adapted to bring the half-finished product
into just the condition necessary for satisfactory operation upon
the particular machine in question, the operation of the latter
machine will be unsatisfactory; and the results to the user and to
the owner of the patents covering that particular machine will
be correspondingly disastrous. Similarly, unless the machine
that immediately follows in the manufacturing process is pre-
cisely adapted to take the half-finished product in just the condi-
tion that it leaves the particular machine, it will inadequately sup-
plement the work that has previously been done, and will wholly
or in part prevent the successful result to which the satisfactory
operation of this particular machine has fully contributed.
Instances of ingenious and delicate machines' each nicely
adapted to perform one stage of a manufacturing process, and
together, as an industrial series, nicely, -accurately and precisely
adjusted to take the raw materials through the successive stages
of the process of manufacture until the finished product is even-
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tually turned out, may be found in many highly developed manu-
facturing industries.
As to any patented article, like the particular type of machines
just described, it is obviously proper that the patent owner, in
order to insure satisfactory results to the user, and to preserve
for himself such commercial value as accrues from the assured
satisfactory operation of his machine, may require that the
machine be used only with such specially adapted machines, and
in such particular manner as will insure satisfactory results to
the user.
Upon this sound economic basis rests the rule established by
the decision of the Supreme Court in the Dick case.
X.
In the closing paragraphs of its opinion, the Supreme Court
examines a long line of decisions in the Federal courts and
in the English courts, in which conclusions were reached sim-
ilar to those embraced in the Dick. decision; and upon the
grounds already noted in a former article,
15 the Court distin-
guishes its previous decisions in respect to the rights of copyright
owners and proprietary medicine manufacturers, and rests its
determination squarely on the constitutional provision regarding
the rights of inventors, and the statutes that have been enacted
in pursuance of this provision.
XI.
The decision of the Supreme Court in the Dick case lays down
the same principles that were affirmed last year in a unanimous
decision of the Lords of the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council which determined the law for the eritire British Empire.
1 6
The decision accords with the whole trend of previous judicial
decision of the United States.
7  The passages above quoted from
Bentent v. National Harrow Company-in which Chief Justice
White, then Associate Justice, participated and concurred-show
1r G. H. Montague: The Sherman Anti-Trust Act and the Patent Law,
YALE LAW JOURNAL, April, 1912.
16 National Phonograph Co. of Australia v. Mench, 104 L. T. Rep., 5
Priv. Council, Feb. 3, 1911; see abstract in G. H. Montague The Sherman
Anti-Trust Act and the Patent Law, YALE LAW JOURNAL, April, 1912.
17 See authorities collected in G. H. Montague, The Sherman Anti-
Trust Act and the Patent Law, YALE LAW JOURNAL, April, 1912.
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how long these principles have been fully recognized. How
familiar this doctrine has been for years, 'how well within the
established law the Court was, in its decision in the Dick case,
and how widely divergent from the whole trend of previous
judicial decision Chief Justice White was, in his dissenting opin-
on, appears from, the opinion of the Supreme Court in United
States v..Bell Telephone Company,' in which Chief Justice White,
s 167 U. S., 224, 1896.
then Associate Justice, agreed and concurred. In his opiniony
the Court, referring to patents issued to inventors, said:
"The government parted with -nothing by the patent. It lost
no property. Its possessions were not diminished. The patentee,
so far as a personal use is concerned, received nothing which he
did not have without the patent, and the monopoly which he did
receive is only for a few years. So the government may well
insist that it has higher rights in a suit to set aside patent for land
than it has in a suit to set aside a patent for" afi invention. There
areweightier reasons Why the government should not be perma-
nently deprived of its property through fraudulent repiesenta-
tions. or other wrongful means, than there are for questioning the
validity of a temporary monopoly or depriving an individual of
the exclusive use for a limited time of that whose actual use he
claims to have made possible, and which after such time, will be
open and free to all. * * * The inventor is one who has discov-
ered something of value. It is his absolute property. He may
withhold the knowledge of it from the public, and he may insist
upon all the advantages and benefits which the statute promises to
him who discloses to the public his invention. He does not make
the law. He does not determine the measure of his rights. The
legislative body, representing the people, has declared what the
public will give for the free use of that invention. He cannot
be heard in the courts to say that it is of such value that he is
entitled to a larger and longer monopoly; that he is not fully com-
pensated, by the receipts during seventeen years, for the great
benefit which his invention has betowed. No representation of
the public is at liberty. to negotiate with him for a new and inde-
pendent contract as to the terms and conditions upon which he
will give up his invention. He must come under the dominion of
the statute, and take that which the public has proffered its will-
ingness to give. As the law making-power, has prescribed what
the public will give, specified the terms and- conditions- of pur-
chase, indicated the time and methods of determining the right of
compensation, he on his part has an absolute legal right to avail
himself of all the provisions thus made."
The same principles were even more emphatically laid down -by.
the Supreme Court, four years-agg, in the Papr'Bag -Case.9
THE SUPREME COURT ON PATENTS
19 Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U. S.,
405, 1908, see abstract in G. H. Montague, The Sherman Ant -Trust Act
and the Patent Law, YALE LAw JOuRNAL, April, 1912.
Chief Justice White, then an Associate Justice, participated in the
,decision of both these cases and concurred with the opinion of the
Court in each case.
In view of the fundamental, well-recognized and long-accepted
-principles upon which rests the decision of the Supreme Court in
the Dick case, the following quotation from the opinion of the
Court deserves consideration by oCngress, by the legal profession
generally, and by the entire community.
"It must not be forgotten that we are dealing with a constitu-
tional and statutory monopoly. An attack upon the rights under
a patent because it secures a monopoly to make, to sell and to use,
is an attack upon the whole patent system. We are not at liberty
to say that the Constitution has unwisely provided for granting a
monopolistic right to inventors, or that Congress has unwisely
failed to impose limitations upon the inventor's exclusive right
to use."
Gilbert H. Montague.
55 Liberty Street, New York

